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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
BARBARA ANN PAINTER 
Plaintiff—Respondent 
vs. 
JAMES RANDALL PAINTER 
Defendant—Appellant 
BRIEF FOR APPELLANT 
Appeal from Judgment, June 25, 1987 
Fourth Judicial District Court, Juab County 
Honorable Ray M. Harding, District Judge 
JURISDICTION 
Jurisdiction is conferred on the Utah Court of Appeals 
pursuant to U.C.A. § 78-2a-3g (1987). 
STATEMENT OF NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
The Plaintiff—Respondent, Barbara Ann Painter, filed a 
complaint against the Defendant—Appellant, James Randall 
Painter, seeking a divorce (R. 1-5). The Defendant by his Answer 
and Counterclaim (R. 20-23, 206-209) also sought a divorce. 
This appeal is from an order, entered in the Fourth Judicial 
District Court of Juab County on the 25th of June, 1987, granting 
to the Plaintiff a decree of divorce from the Defendant (R* 283-
287). Defendant filed a notice of appeal as directed by the Utah 
Rules of Civil Procedure on the 23rd of July, 1987 (R. 290-291). 
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Civil No. 870317-CA 
Category No. 14b 
STATUTORY PROVISIONS 
The statutory provisions relevant to the determination of 
the present case are found in the Fourteenth Amendment of the 
U.S. Constitution and in Title 30, Chapter 3 of the Utah Code 
Annotated. Relevant portions are reproduced in Addendum "A". 
STATEMENT OP THE CASE 
Plaintiff and Defendant were married on April 23, 1968 in 
Nephi, Utah and separated in March of 1986. They are and have 
been residents of Juab County, State of Utah, for more than three 
months prior to this action. Defendant treated Plaintiff cruelly 
causing her mental distress and suffering (R. 1-2, 253-54, 275). 
They have four minor children; Aaron Painter, Mario Painter, 
Benjamin Painter, and MeLea Painter. The court awarded custody 
and control of the minor children, MeLea and Benjamin, to the 
Plaintiff subject to reasonable visitation rights by the 
Defendant (R. 254, 275). The Court interviewed the two oldest 
sons pursuant to a stipulcition entered into by the parties (R. 
271, 288-89). Thereafter, the Plaintiff contacted the Court, 
arranged for a subsequent interview of the children, and the 
Court re-interviewed them without notice to the Defendant or his 
counsel (R. 271, 288-89). Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded 
joint custody of Aaron and Mario with the principal place of 
residence being with Plaintiff. Aaron and Mario are to live six 
months of the year with Defendant so long as both parties reside 
in Nephi; however, should either party move from Nephi, then 
Plaintiff shall have custody of Aaron and Mario subject to 
reasonable visitation rights by the Defendant (R. 254, 275-76). 
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The Court found the Defendant to be able-bodied and employed 
by Painter Motor Company, earning in excess of $2,000 per month. 
It was ordered that the Defendant pay to the Plaintiff $160 per 
month per child in her care and custody and provide health and 
accident insurance on the minor children. Defendant was excused 
from paying the child support during the six months he
 ;has 
custody of Aaron and Mario. Also, the Court found Plaintiff in 
need of alimony and Defendant capable of paying $450 per month. 
Defendant is to pay all obligations incurred during the marriage, 
including any amount owed on the Riviera automobile, except for 
Plaintiff's obligation for any amount due or to become due on the 
family home mortgage (R. 254-55, 276-77). 
The Court ordered the following division of property (R. 
254-56, 276-79, 280-81): 
To Plaintiff 
a. Exclusive possession of the family home having an 
appraised value of $76,000 less the mortgage of 
$24,409.70, with each party being awarded one-half of 
the equity therein, based upon the 1987 values. 
b. The $7,000 lot and $ 8,736.51 remaining cash in the 
retirement fund. 
c. One-half of the proceeds from the lot valued at $6,000 
to be sold immediately. 
d. The 1983 Riviera automobile with Defendant required to 
make necessary arrangements to secure clear title. 
e. One-half of the household furnishing. Plaintiff shall 
prepare two lists of said property and shall provide 
the lists to the Defendant, who shall select the list 
of property he wishes to have. The remaining list of 
property shall belong to the Plaintiff. 
fe Attorney's fees and costs in the amount of $1,500 to 
bear an interest rate of 12% per annum until paid. 
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To Defendant 
a. One-half of the present equity in the family home. 
b. The Painter Family Limited Partnership and Painter 
Motor Company stock interests. 
c. One-half of the proceeds from the lot valued at $6,000. 
d. One-half of the household furnishing. 
On March 18, 1986, the trial court issued a restraining 
order which restrained both parties from "disposing of any of the 
real property, personal property, business propeirty or investment 
property, money or funds belonging to the parties . . . ." The 
Court ruled that the Defendant violated that order by making 
payments to Zions First National Bank for $15,460.27 (business 
loan); to Painter Motor for $3,085.08 (pay advance); to Painter 
Motor Insurance for $1,622.48 (loan); to First Security Bank for 
$1,589.87 (loan); and to Honda for $2,456.28 (motorcycles). The 
Court ruled that Defendant's payments to the IRS and State Tax 
Commission were appropriate. The parties had accumulated $36,688 
in the retirement fund from which the payments described were 
made. After the Court's allowance for the tax payments, it ruled 
that the retirement fund should have had $32,950.59 remaining. 
Therefore, Plaintiff was entitled to half ($16,475.30) of the 
retirement fund, satisfied by the $7,000 lot and the remaining 
$8,736.51 cash (R. 255-56, 277-78, 390-93). 
In addition, the court awarded the motorcycles to the 
children, and Defendant is to assume any remaining obligations 
due thereon (R. 255, 277). Further, those items used by the 
children exclusively (bedroom sets) are not to be considered as 
the marital property for division (R. 256, 278-79). 
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SUMMARY OP THE ARGUMENT 
This court should rule for the Defendant—Appellant by 
reversing the trial court's following decisions. 
First, the record indicates that the obligations paid by the 
Defendant with retirement fund monies were marital obligations, 
incurred before separation (R. 390-93). Accordingly, the court 
should equitably divided these debts and should specifically 
explain the reasons for their division. In failing to do so, the 
trial court did not distribute the assets equitably. 
Second, equity requires that the trial court clearly specify 
that the Limited Partnership and Painter Motor stock interests 
were the Defendant's separate property. The trend in Utah, and 
other states, has been to award a spouse's separate property to 
the spouse outside of the marital assets unless adequate 
justification could be shown for dividing the separate property. 
Third, the trial court violated the defendant's rights to 
due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment 
when it interviewed the two oldest boys on the request of the 
plaintiff without notifying the defendant (R. 288-89). Also, the 
Utah Supreme Court ruled in Martinez v. Martinez. 728 P.2d 994 
(Utah 1986), that the reasons for giving custody to one parent 
over another must be specifically stated to be upheld on appeal. 
Fourth, following the decision in Izatt v. Izatt. 627 P. 2d 
49 (Utah 1981), the court should consider the difference between 
Plaintiff's separate property, the Cordoba's value, and the cost 
of the Riviera as a marital obligation, and as such, equity would 
require that it be divided between the parties. 
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ARGUMENT 
X. EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE DEFENDANT RECEIVE CREDIT FOR THE 
MARITAL OBLIGATIONS PAID. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1987) states, "When a decree of 
divorce is rendered, the court may include in it equitable orders 
relating to the children, property and parties. . . ." While the 
trial court has generally great latitude and discretion in 
determining what is equitable, Burnham v. Burnham, 716 P.2d 781 
(Utah 1986); Hansen v. Hansen, 537 P.2d 491 (Utah 1975), the Utah 
Supreme Court in Wilson v. Wilson, 5 Utah 2d 79, 81 296 P.2d 977, 
979 (1956) stated that a marital termination settlement should be 
just and equitable and failure to so be would require the Court 
to substitute its own findings and judgments in the interest of 
justice and equity. Wright v. Wright, 586 P.2d 443 (Utah 1978); 
see, Berger v. Berger, 713 P. 2d 695 (Utah 1985); Watson v. 
Watson. 561 P.2d 1072 (Utah 1977). 
A. The obligations paid from the retirement fund were 
marital obligations. 
The Utah Supreme Court in Humphreys v. Humphreys. 520 P. 2d 
193 (Utah 1974) , recognized and held that its duty in a divorce 
case is to review facts as well as law. In so doing, the 
Defendant, James Randall Painter, contends that in reviewing the 
record, this Court should reasonably determine that all of the 
debts paid by the Defendant, (R. 255-56, 277-78) using the 
retirement fund, were marital debts incurred prior to separation 
with the exception of the motorcycles purchased by the Defendant 
for his sons (R. 390-393) . The amount of the retirement fund 
used for the motorcycles was $2,456.28 (R. 393). 
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While the Defendant states that he did not tell Plaintiff 
about some of the obligations incurred by him (R. 398-400) , the 
Supreme Court of Utah in Gill v. Gill, 718 P.2d 779 (Utah 1986), 
held that evidence regarding a wife's knowledge that her husband 
was operating a business was sufficient to support finding that 
husband did not hide or secrete marital assets in violation of 
restraining order or rights of wife. The Defendant's situation 
is very similar in this case in that he may have incurred the 
debts without the Plaintiff's specific knowledge, but by her 
receiving a monthly check for household expenses (R. 3 04), it can 
be reasonably assumed that Plaintiff did know that Defendant was 
overseeing the business of bringing money home for the benefit of 
his family, which business might include incurring loans or 
investments in areas such as mining futures. These investments 
would produce profits and losses, both of which should be 
considered marital assets or liabilities. 
B. Marital obligations should be divided equitably. 
The Plaintiff pleaded by her complaint (R. 1-5) and the 
Defendant admitted by his answer (R. 20-23) and counterclaim (R. 
206-09) that an equitable distribution of obligations and 
liabilities should be made as provided under U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1). 
In addition to Gill in Utah, other jurisdictions have ruled 
that marital obligations should be divided to insure equity. For 
example, in Hughes v. Hughes, 91 N.M. 339, 573 P.2d 1194 (1978), 
the court stated that there should be an equal distribution of 
campaign debts between husband and wife incurred by the husband. 
See also Fredericksen v. Fredericksen, 185 Mont. 548, 605 P.2d 
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1135 (1980). Also, in Alaska, Burcell v. Burcell, 713 P.2d 802 
(Ak. 1986), the court ruled that where the trial court failed to 
divide or at least explain its reason for not dividing debt owed 
to husband's father, owed to credit card accounts, and settlement 
money received from condominium vendor, there was no indication 
that the trial court had considered husband's situation and its 
ruling was clearly unjust. The decision in the Burcell case 
should be applied to the case before this court in that no 
explanation was given by the trial court as to why credit was not 
allowed to the Defendant for paying marital obligations. The 
trial court only states that it gave the matter consideration (R. 
288-89) which is insufficient under Burcell. Id,, 
Given that the trial court did not state its reasons for 
failing to give credit for Defendant's payment of marital 
liabilities, three possible assumptions can be made as to the 
trial court's reasoning. First, it can be assumed that the trial 
court's language indicates that it feels the debts paid were only 
those of the Defendant (R. 255-56, 289), but the caes cited would 
clearly indicate that such a philosophy is unjust and should be 
reversed. A second assumption might be that the court considered 
the marital obligations paid by the Defendant and concluded that 
equity would encourage him to pay for all of them. However, in 
Wyoming, Smith v. Smith, 704 P.2d 1319 (Wyo. 1985), the court 
ruled that child support, alimony, division of property and other 
financial matters must be considered together in making a just 
and equitable disposition of family assets. In considering these 
criteria in the present case, it is apparent that the trial court 
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awarded liberal alimony and custody payments totally $1090 (R. 
276) per month or about 67% of the Defendant's stated take-home 
pay of $1,543 per month after taxes (R. 335), and it would be 
unjust to not approximate a 50 percent property division in 
regards to these debts as was done with the majority of the 
assets (R. 254-56, 276-79, 280-81). A final assumption may be 
that because of Defendant's violation of the injunction against 
dispersing marital assets, the trial court awarded the Plaintiff 
an unequitable amount of marital assets to penalize Defendant. 
However, in Preston v. Preston, 646 P.2d 705 (Utah 1982), the 
Supreme Court allowed for the property settlement to remain in 
spite of the wife's contempt. The Court stated that while the 
trial court should have adjudicated some consequence for the 
contempt, it wasn't going to change the property settlement per 
se. In the Defendant's case, no consequences were specifically 
stated in the record as adjudication for the contempt. If the 
trial court penalized the Defendant for his contempt, it should 
be stated and be appropriate in comparison to the harm done. 
To summarize, the obligations paid for by the Defendant with 
the retirement fund were marital obligations having occurred 
before separation, except for the motorcycle purchases * As such 
and given the other liberal provisions of the divorce degree, 
equity requires that the Defendant receive credit for payment of 
these debts. Accordingly, Defendant should be entitled to half of 
the $7,000 lot and the remainder of the cash after Plaintiff gets 
half the $2,456.28 (motorcycles) + $8,736.51 (cash). In other 
words, Defendant should receive 8,736.51 - 5,596.40 = $3,140.11. 
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II. EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE DEPENDANT'S LIMITED PARTNERSHIP AND 
PAINTER MOTOR STOCK INTERESTS SHOULD BE RULED AS SEPARATE 
ASSETS. 
The Utah Supreme Court has stated as a broad proposition 
that property subject to division upon divorce encompasses all 
assets of every nature possessed by the parties, whenever 
obtained and from whatever source derived. Encrlert v. Englert, 
576 P.2d 1274, 1276 (Utah 1978); see also Hamilton v. Hamilton, 
562 P.2d 235 (Utah 1977). However, there is a possible exception 
which involves the acquisition of property by a spouse during 
marriage through gift or inheritance. 
Generally, this exception is that property acquired by gift 
or inheritance requires that some justification, such as the kind 
or source of property, length of marriage, or if the family 
helped in the property's growth or acquisition, be found before 
giving any interest in such asset to the non-recipient spouse. 
With this exception, courts can deal with the varying equitable 
issues related to the overall property and support provisions 
being made for the family. See, Preston, 646 P.2d at 706. For 
example, in Preston, even though husband performed some legal 
services and other work, regarding property inherited by his wife 
during the marriage, wife's inheritance was not acquired through 
joint efforts of the parties and thus, in divorce action, wife 
was entitle to the inheritance as her separate property. Id. ; 
see also, Joraensen v. Joraensen, 667 P.2d 22 (Utah 1983). 
As such, the trend, in most cases decided before the Utah 
Supreme Court, has been to award a spouse's separate property to 
the spouse outside of the marital assets unless adequate 
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justification could be shown for dividing the separate property. 
For example in Eames v. Eames. 735 P.2d 395 (Utah Ct. App. 1987), 
the court gave to each party their separate assets which included 
paternal family partnerships, inherited property, and gifts from 
parents. See Searle v. Searle. 522 P.2d 697 (Utah 1974); see 
also Burke v. Burke, 733 P.2d 133 (Utah 1987) (equity may require 
that any appreciation of inherited property not become part of 
the marital estate). 
Other jurisdictions have been split on whether to hold a 
gift or inheritance acquired by a spouse during marriage as 
martial property and subject to equitable distribution along with 
other assets. In Florida, as in Utah, the rule is generally that 
a gift or inheritance is part of the marital assets if adequate 
justification exists. Rosen v. Rosen, 386 So.2d 1286 (Fla. 3rd 
DCA 1980). However, the Illinois Supreme Court ruled in a 
leading case on this subject that property which is acquired for 
example by gift or inheritance is deemed to be non-marital 
property because demonstrably it was not obtained through any 
joint enterprise of the spouse but through an independent source. 
In Re Marriage of Komnick, 84 111. 2d 89, 417 N.E.2d 1305 (1981). 
Finally, in Washington, the court ruled that in making a property 
division, the court must bear in mind correct community or 
separate property status for property to be divided and failure 
to do so constitutes reversible error. Pollock v. Pollock, 7 
Wash. App. 394, 499 P.2d 213 (1972). 
It appears that the key point in most jurisdictions is for a 
court to be equitable in divorce decrees. And equity can not be 
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satisfied if there is no value placed on where the asset came 
from, length of marriage, or family help in the assets 
maintenance and growth. Preston, 646 P.2d at 706. In this case, 
equity requires that the Defendant be explicitly given his 
Limited Partnership and Painter Motor stock interests as separate 
property because of the facts that they were gifts and that the 
Plaintiff was not required to invest her energies to maintain or 
help these assets grow. (R. 340-43). 
III. THE DEFENDANT'S RIGHTS OP DUE PROCESS AND EQUAL PROTECTION 
UNDER THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT ARE VIOLATED IN REGARDS TO 
CUSTODY. 
Under the Fourteenth Amendment, "due process" emphasizes 
fairness between the state and the individual dealing with the 
state, regardless of how other individuals in the same situation 
may be treated; "equal protection" emphasizes disparity in 
treatment by a state between classes of individuals whose 
situations are arguably indistinguishable. In addition, both 
usually arise together. Ross v. Moffitt, 417 U.S. 600. 
When the custody of a child is at issue, while the court is 
entitled to interview the child privately, it is reversible 
error, or a grave impropriety, for the trial court to fail to 
disclose to one of the parties, what occurred during the 
interview, since the parties should be afforded an opportunity to 
rebut any statements made in the private interview. Douglas v. 
Sheffner, 79 Wyo. 172, 331 P.2d 840. Furthermore, courts have 
held that notice and an opportunity to be heard are essential to 
due process of law and have not hesitated to strike orders that 
violate party's rights. Paronto v. Armstrong, 161 Kan. 720, 171 
12 
P.2d 299 (1946). See also, Strecker v. Wilkinson, 220 Kan. 292, 
552 P.2d 979 (1976) (due process requires reasonable notice even 
in the absence of an express statutory provision requiring such 
notice). In the case before this court, the trial court admits 
to having interviewed the two oldest children at the request of 
the Plaintiff and without notice to the Defendant or his counsel 
(R. 288-89). This is in strict violation of the Fourteenth 
Amendment's right to due process as explained in the decisions 
above and to equal protection in that the Plaintiff had notice of 
the private interview while the Defendant did not. 
Furthermore, in this case, the court did not state in the 
record on what basis it found that the custody arrangement was in 
the "best interests" (R. 289) of the children. The Supreme Court 
of Utah has held that the trial court's practice of simply 
declaring that one parent should have custody over another 
without specifically showing or explaining why that conclusion 
was reached cannot pass muster when the custody award is 
challenged on appeal. Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994 (Utah 
1986); Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d 423 (Utah 1986). 
For these reasons, it should be found that the trial court 
violated Defendant's rights to due process and equal protection, 
and furthermore, that the court failed to specifically state its 
reasons for granting custody to the Plaintiff. As a result, the 
custody arrangement should be reversed with prejudice and a new 
custody trial ordered. 
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IV. EQUITY REQUIRES THAT THE AUTOMOBILE SHOULD NOT BE PROVIDED 
TO THE PLAINTIFF "FREE AND CLEAR". 
In Izatt v, Izatt. 627 P. 2d 49 (Utah 1981), the Supreme 
Court held that where a wife obtained separate property of 
$97,000 through a malpractice suit, subject to some outstanding 
debt to her husband's family, she and her husband would both be 
required to pay one-half of the debt. The Court's rationale was 
that since the debt was incurred directly for the support of the 
family to heal the wife of her injuries it was a marital 
obligation, in spite of the fact that the debt was on the wife's 
separate property assets. 
In the case before this court, the Plaintiff, like in Izatt, 
indisputably had an asset, a Cordoba automobile, that would be 
considered her separate property (R. 327) . However, when the 
Defendant brought home the Riviera automobile for her use (R. 
3 27) , and as its use directly benefited the family, then the 
difference between Plaintiff's separate property equity in the 
Cordoba and the outstanding loan on the Riviera should be 
considered a marital obligation. Furthermore, as explained in 
Argument I, under Smith, 704 P.2d at 1319, the court ruled that 
alimony, child support, and other financial matters must be 
considered in determining a just and equitable disposition of 
assets and/or liabilities. As mentioned, the Defendant contends 
that the trial court was liberal in the alimony and custody 
payment requirements, and as such, it would be unequitable to 
require the Defendant to assume more than 50 percent of the 
marital obligation of providing the automobile "free and clear". 
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CONCLUSION 
The Defendant—Appellant, James Randall Painter, 
respectfully requests that the portions of the trial court's 
property settlement which grant to Plaintiff—Respondent the 
remainder of the retirement fund and the entire $7,000 lot, which 
do not specifically consider Defendant's Limited Partnership and 
Painter Motor stock interests as separate assets, and which 
require Defendant to provide the Riviera automobile "free and 
clear" should be reversed as inequitable for the reasons stated. 
Additionally, the Defendant—Appellant, alleges that the 
trial court violated his rights to due process and equal 
protection in regards to custody of his two oldest boys. 
Furthermore, the trial court failed to specifically state its 
reasons for the custody arrangement provided. As such, the trial 
court's custody arrangement should be reversed with prejudice and 
a new custody trial ordered. 
Respectively submitted this ,^^6/day of November, 1987. 
Harris and Carter 
(laceA i\ Mi 
Michael J. Petro 
Attorney for Defendant—Appellant 
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Fourteenth Amendment § 1, U.S. Constitution 
All persons born or naturalized in the United States, and 
subject to the jurisdiction thereof, are citizens of the 
Untied States and of the State wherein they reside. No 
State shall make or enforce any law which shall abridge the 
privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; 
nor shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or 
property, without due process of law; nor deny to any person 
within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws. 
U.C.A. § 30-3-5(1) (Supp. 1987): Disposition of Property, etc. 
(1) When a decree of divorce is rendered, the court may 
include in it equitable order relating to the children, 
property, and parties. . . . 
